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Abstract 
 
We study how competition and corporate governance may explain investment decisions of 
Mexican manufacturing firms. We develop the study with indexes of market concentration 
and agency costs and OLS regressions. The analysis uses longitudinal census data. Our 
results suggest that investment is better explained by the Dominance Index, a Mexican 
measure of concentration, than by the Herfindahl-Hirschman one. They also suggest that 
agency costs (proxy for the degree of separation of ownership and control), and market 
competition may encourage investment decisions. Furthermore they suggest an inverse 
relationship between market competition and agency costs. We believe that our findings 
support the hypothesis that competition may be an alternative mechanism to encourage 
corporate practices in emerging economies.   
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CORPORATE GOVERACE, MARKET COMPETITIO AD IVESTMET 
DECISIOS I MEXICA MAUFACTURIG FIRMS 
 
1. Introduction 
Traditional microeconomic theory explains firms` behavior and their decisions assuming that 
firms and their managers pursue the goal of maximizing profits. Such assumption is plausible 
because firm owners usually aim at making their firms as valuable as possible; and because 
competitive markets may punish firms that do not maximize profits. However, in practice, 
owners and managers do not necessarily agree on the strategic direction and performance of 
firms. Indeed the failure to maximize the value of firms has been explained as a consequence 
of the differences between ownership and management [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. 
 
Financial management theory accepts that firms´ behavior also depends on corporate 
governance practices. One main determinant of how stakeholders take and execute decisions 
is the degree of separation between ownership and control. Such separation occurs due to the 
asymmetric interests of managers and owners and because of the way that costs and rewards 
are allocated among the stakeholders. In practice such separation usually materializes into 
agency costs [Ang, Cole and Lin (2000)]. Paradoxically, studies that measure these costs only 
exist since the late 1980`s [McKnight and Weir, (2009)]. 
 
Corporate governance theory contributes to explain firms´ behavior and their decisions, like 
investment ones.  Particularly, Grabowski and Mueller (1972) suggest that the degree of the 
separation between ownership and control explains investment decisions. Indeed, they predict 
a positive relationship between cash flows and investment for firms that experience agency 
problems. Their argument is supported by the empirical findings of Gugler, Mueller and 
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Yurtoglu (2007). They indicate that legal systems, accounting standards, and ownership 
structures systematically affect investment decisions in European economies. 
 
However, the effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms has been questioned by 
Allen and Gale (2000). In fact, they suggest that other factors are important to explain firms´ 
behavior.  Concretely they argue that competition may provide a substitute for governance 
mechanisms. They arrive to such conclusion after examining evidence from Germany, Japan, 
US and UK. Particularly, Allen (2005) suggests that market competition may be useful to 
ensure good corporate governance practices in emerging economies. His suggestion is argued 
on the basis that the markets of such economies are imperfect and incomplete. 
 
Here we study how corporate governance, market competition and investment relate in an 
emerging economy. Concretely we analyze the effects of market concentration and agency 
cost determinants on investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms. We use several 
concentration and agency cost indexes as measures of competition and corporate governance. 
Particularly, we focus on manufacturing firms because their activities have been considered 
essential to encourage economic development [Nurkse, (1953); Lewis, (1954)]. We study 
them with longitudinal data of the last census available for the Mexican economy. 
 
Here we aim at suggesting answers to the following questions: How are related corporate 
governance, market competition and economic development? How market competition may 
affect the relationships between corporate governance and investment in emerging 
economies? What measures exists to assess agency costs and market concentration? Are they 
statistically adequate to assess the determinants of investment? What firms´ characteristics 
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may be important to understand investment decisions? Does firms` size matters? Which type 
of implications may be derived from these findings?    
 
Methodologically, we study the effects of the separation between ownership and control on 
investment decisions with two agency cost indexes. We use the ones proposed by Bøhren et 
al. (2007) and Danielson and Scott (2007).   Concretely, we use the ratio of operating 
expenses to annual sales and the ratio of annual sales to total assets. We assume that the 
larger the ratios, the more asymmetric the interests of managers and owners.  We consider 
both financial measures as complementary ones of how the stakeholders determine and 
control the strategic direction and performance of firms.  
 
We study the effects of market competition on investment decisions with two concentration 
indexes. Concretely, we use the well-known Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the 
Dominance Index (DI) proposed by Garcia-Alba (1990). The HHI one is the traditional 
measure of market concentration. The DI is a measure used by Mexican regulators to assess 
market competition. The main difference between both measures is that the DI explicitly 
accounts the size of firms to measure market concentration. We use both indexes as 
alternative measures of the degree of market competition.   
 
Our study has some distinctive features that differentiate it with respect to other studies. The 
first one is that it focuses on an emerging economy. A second feature is that it analyzes 
jointly the effects of corporate governance and market competition determinants on 
investment. Such feature is consistent with the proposals of Allen (2005) to encourage 
development. The third one is that it focuses on manufacturing firms. Most corporate 
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governance studies for Mexican firms focus on financial ones. The last feature is that we use 
an alternative measure of concentration for empirical purposes.     
 
We follow several steps to develop this study. First, we build the market concentration 
indexes and agency cost measures with longitudinal census data for the 182 industries that 
include the Mexican manufacturing sector according to the last census available (INEGI, 
2008), Then we estimate several OLS regression sets to analyze the determinants of 
investment of micro, small, medium and large size firms. In such assessments, we control for 
the effects of certain firms characteristics (cash flow and investment opportunities). Finally, 
we use several statistical tests to check the robustness of our results. 
 
The econometric evidence suggests that the separation of ownership and control and market 
competition may encourage investment decisions among manufacturing firms. Our findings 
show that increases in agency costs or decreases in market concentration may increase 
investment. The estimations also show that the effects of firms´ size, cash flow and 
investment opportunities are mostly significant and positive on investment decisions. 
Furthermore, the statistical tests suggest that the regression models explain adequately 
investment decisions mainly for medium and large firms.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature focusing on the 
relationships among economic development, corporate governance and market competition in 
emerging economies. Section 3 describes the methodological design of the research. It 
focuses on the data sources, variables, modeling specification and econometric techniques. 
Section 4 shows the econometric outcomes and its interpretation. It also shows the results of 
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the statistical estimators and tests that support the empirical assessment. Section 5 concludes 
and discusses the main findings.  
 
2. Economic development, corporate governance, market competition and investment 
Economic theory shows that long-run growth relies on investment decisions. Particularly, 
classical development economics support the view that investments in the manufacturing 
industry are essential to encourage the industrialization of underdeveloped economies. 
Indeed, many economists like Nurkse (1953) and Lewis (1954) argue in favor of investments 
in the manufacturing industry to take advantage of the supply of labor existing in such 
economies. According to them, the “vicious circle of poverty” could be broken by investing 
in the manufacturing sector. Thus their policy recommendations focus on the promotion of 
manufacturing activities.  
 
Currently some economists believe that corporate governance practices may contribute to 
foster growth [Mayer (2001), Claessens (2006)]. They argue that good practices contribute to 
reduce capital costs, to increase returns on equity, to promote efficiency and favorable 
treatments of all stakeholders. Moreover, they argue that such practices are useful to allocate 
capital and to manage risks properly. Good corporate governance leads to economic growth 
by enhancing corporate decisions and firms´ performance. Thus, according to their 
arguments, the study of the relationships between corporate governance and investment 
decisions should be a natural research field for development studies.         
 
Paradoxically, empirical studies regarding the effects of corporate governance on investment 
decisions do not focus on emerging economies. Most of them focus in developed ones [see 
Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007)]. Several problems explain such situation. Some relate 
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to the lack of institutional mechanisms to collect reliable and verifiable data. Others relate to 
stakeholders, who usually cannot recognize and understand their roles, rights and 
responsibilities. Studies that have analyzed these relationships for emerging and transition 
economies are Estrin (2002), Claessens (2006) and Mueller and Peev (2007).  
 
Emerging economies are characterized by weak institutions that cannot always enforce good 
corporate governance practices. Traditionally, laws have been used to enforce these practices. 
However, some studies suggest that it may not be optimal to use the law in emerging 
economies. Indeed, Allen (2005:175) claims that “ensuring that emerging economies have 
effective legal systems and institutions is neither necessary nor sufficient for ensuring good 
economic performance”. Such considerations explain why he proposes competition, trust, and 
reputation as alternative mechanisms to promote good corporate practices among these 
economies. 
 
We believe that competition is an important and feasible mechanism to encourage good 
corporate governance practices. This belief derives from the theoretical work of Allen and 
Gale (2000). There, they show that competition in product markets may ensure good 
corporate governance practices by disciplining management. Their conclusion is supported 
by Singh (2003). Indeed he argues that agency costs, induced by the separation of ownership 
and control, must be inversely related with the intensity of oligopolistic competition in the 
product markets. He reaches this conclusion on the basis of a review of several studies for 
emerging economies.  
 
However, evidence on the relationships between corporate governance and market 
competition is relatively scarce.  Nickell (1996) supports the hypothesis that competition 
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improves corporate performance and productivity growth among UK firms. Januszewski, 
Koke and Winter (2002) find that competition and tight controls seem to be complements 
among German firms. They also find that firms experience high productivity growth when 
markets are competitive.  For emerging economies, the only study that we know is the one of 
Pattanayak and Pant (2010). They find a positive relationship between ownership and 
competition variables among Indian firms. 
 
We conclude this review by indicating that the analysis of the relationships among corporate 
governance, market competition and investment decisions seems a promissory research field. 
Here we analyze such relationships in the context of an emerging economy and its 
manufacturing sector. Concretely, we study the effects of the separation of ownership and 
control and market concentration on firms´ investments to complement existing corporate 
finance, industrial organization and economic development studies. In the following section, 
we show how we develop such analysis for the Mexican manufacturing firms.   
 
3. Methodology 
In this section we describe the methodological design of our investigation. Specifically, we 
describe the sources of data and the indexes used in the assessment of the determinants of 
investment. Furthermore we describe the econometric modeling and testing procedures. Here 
we should emphasize that we focus on the issues related to the separation between ownership 
and control and market concentration.  We focus on such issues because they are the most 
commonly studied in the corporate governance and industrial organization literatures. Such 
issues define the scope and limitations of our study. 
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3.1 Data sources 
We use data of the Mexican manufacturing firms obtained from the “Economic Census 2003” 
reported by the Bureau of Statistics (known as INEGI). Methodologically, the census is 
constructed accordingly to the North-American-Industry-Classification-System (NAICS). It 
includes 12 classificatory groups of firms for each of the 182 industries. We use this 
longitudinal data set because previous censuses are built with non-comparable 
methodologies. In Mexico, census data are collected every five years. Currently, the 
definitive data for the census collected in 2008 are not available.  
 
In Mexico, firm-level data are not available due to confidentiality reasons. We deal with such 
constraint by constructing a set of four groups of representative firms for the 182 industries 
included in the census. We build the representative firms accordingly to the number of 
employees. A micro firm has no more than 10 employees. A small firm has between 11 and 
50. A medium firm has between 51 and 250. A large firm has at least 251 employees. This 
simplified system follows the one of the Mexican Economics Ministry (known as SE). For 
comparative purposes, Table 1 shows the relationships between the INEGI and SE systems. 
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Table 1: The census and the Mexican Economics Ministry classification for 
manufacturing firms 
 
IEGI Census´ 
Classification of Firms in 
the Industry i 
(t) 
Employees in the Firms 
that Belong to Group t 
Mean of Employees in 
the Firms that Belong 
to Group t 
(Mjt) 
Type of Firm According 
to the SE classification 
1 0-2 1 Micro 
2 3-5 4 Micro 
3 6-10 8 Micro 
4 11-15 13 Small 
5 16-20 18 Small 
6 21-30 25 Small 
7 31-50 40 Small 
8 51-100 75 Medium 
9 101-250 175 Medium 
10 251-500 375 Large 
11 501-1000 750 Large 
12 1000+  Large 
The table shows the relationships between the INEGI Economic Census´ classification and the one of the Mexican 
Economics Ministry (SE). The census classifies firms of each industry into groups according to the number of employees. 
The census has 12 classificatory groups for each of the 182 industries. The SE classification considers four types of firms. A 
micro firm has no more than 10 employees. A small firm has between 11 and 50. A medium firm has between 51 and 250. A 
large firm has at least 251 employees. The mean of employees for the firms of the twelfth group is the average of employees 
with respect to the total of firms in the twelfth group. 
 
We build each representative firm in order to describe the behavior for the representative firm 
of size “j” of industry “i”. We estimate a weighted variable to assess the effects of the size of 
the firms according to the SE classification system. We use as weight the mean of the number 
of employees by each type of firm.  The representative firm variable is calculated as follows:   
12...,1,t
43,2,1,j
182...,1,i
Mn
Mn
P
t
jtijt
jtijt
ijt
=
=
=
=
∑
                         (1) 
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where Pijt is the weighted indicator of the industry “i”, size “j”, group “t”; nijt is the number of 
firms of the industry “i”, size “j”, group “t”; Mjt is the mean of the number of employees of 
size “j” in group “t”; the subindex “i” refers to the i-th industry; the subindex “j” refers to the 
firm of size “j” (micro, small, medium and large firms); the subindex “t” refers to the t-th 
groups included in the size-j classification. 
 
We build representative indicator variables for all the independent and dependent variables. 
We use the weighted indicator of each one of the four representative firms of industry i to 
estimate each variable. We multiply Pijt by each variable included in the census classification 
for each one of the twelve groups of firms Vijt. Such multiplications added accordingly to 
each subindex “t” provide us with a variable each representative firm of size “j” of the 
industry “i”.   
12...,1,t
43,2,1,j
182...,1,i
t
ijt
V
ijt
P
ij
RF
=
=
=
∑=
                        (2) 
where RFij is a variable associated to the representative firm of the industry “i”, size “j”; Pijt is 
the weighted indicator of the industry “i”, size “j”, group “t”.  
 
3.2 Variables 
Here we describe the variables used to analyze the relationships among corporate 
governance, market competition and investment. Given the multifaceted nature of corporate 
governance and competition, we use several measures to capture their main characteristics. 
Concretely, we use two agency cost proxies to assess the degree of separation between 
ownership and control. We also use two market concentration indexes to assess the degree of 
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competition.  The control variables include cash flows, investment opportunities and firms´ 
size. The set of dependent, independent and control variables is summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Investment and its determinants 
Variables (Indexes) Measures    Indicator 
Dependent variable 
Investment  Fixed capital expenditures Gross fixed capital formation 
(Value of the fixed assets bought 
minus the value of the fixed assets 
sold) 
Independent Variables 
HHI Market concentration 1  Herfindhal-Hirschman  
DI Market concentration 2 Dominance Index 
Operating expenses ratio  Separation of ownership and 
control 1 
Ratio of operating expenses to 
annual sales 
Asset utilization ratio  Separation of ownership and 
control 2 
Ratio of annual sales to total assets 
Econometric control variables  
Investment opportunities Ratio of output to capital Ratio of production value to fixed 
capital stock 
Cash flow Earnings  Net earnings  
Firm size Fixed assets Total value of fixed assets 
The table shows the variables and indicators used in the econometric assessments. The dependent variable is investment. 
The independent variables aim to capture the main features of the separation of ownership and control and of market 
competition. The table includes the definitions of the variables according to the Economic Census of I!EGI (Mexican 
Bureau of Statistics). 
 
We choose the independent variables under theoretical and empirical considerations. We 
choose the corporate governance ones assuming the existence of a separation between 
ownership and control (agency problem).  Empirically, such separation is usually measured 
with agency costs proxies. Here we use the two complementary measures of agency costs 
proposed by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) and Danielson and Scott (2007). These measures are 
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the operating-expenses and the asset-utilization ratios.
 
Both are measures that indicate how 
effectively the firm’s management controls operating costs and deploys its assets.
 1
  
 
We use two alternative measures of concentration to measure market competition
2
: The 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Dominance Index (DI). The HHI is the 
traditional measure of market concentration.  It is considered an adequate measure as long as 
big differences do not exist among the firms of an industry. However, we should recognize 
that this may not be the case for many industries. We use an alternative measure, the DI 
index, proposed by Garcia-Alba (1990), to take into account this fact. Such measure is used 
by Mexican regulators to assess how differences in firms´ size may affect the strategic 
interactions in a market.
3
 
 
We should point out that we do not build the HHI and DI indexes for each of the 182 
industries that integrate the manufacturing sector. Certain groups of manufacturing industries 
are, for practical purposes, competitors in the same market.  We group the industries into 21 
subsectors to take into account this fact. Each concentration measure assumes that all the 
firms in a subsector belong to the same market. We use the total number of firms that belong 
to each group of industries to build the concentration measure that corresponds to each 
subsector. Thus, we estimate a total of 42 subsector measures of the HHI and DI types.  
 
                                                
1
 When the operating expenses ratio increases, there is a decrease in efficiency. When the asset utilization ratio 
increases there is an increase of resources controlled by the management. 
2 Traditional industrial organization studies analyze firms under the guidelines of the Structure-Conduct-
Performance (SCP) paradigm. Particularly, the studies associated to the “Structure-Performance hypothesis” 
assume that the degree of market concentration is inversely related to the degree of competition. 
3
 The DI index is different from the Kwoka's dominance index used to analyze firm size inequality and the 
number of firms. See Garcia-Alba (1990) and Kwoka (1977).     
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Methodologically, the HHI and DI variables are built in different ways. Concretely, assuming 
that mks represents the share of the firm k in the total product of the subsector s; n is the 
number of firms in the subsector s, the HHI index is built as: 
∑
=
=
n
1k
2
kss mHHI               (3) 
The DI is built with an index for grouped data proposed by Garcia-Alba (1990). In such 
index, Mts is the share of the firm average production of the group t in the production of the 
subsector s, and  !t is the number of firms in group t. 
4
  
∑ 





=
t s
ts
ts
HHI
M
!DI
2
2
             (4) 
 
We use firm size, cash flow and investment opportunities as control variables following some 
recent studies. Concretely, Adelegen and Ariyo (2008) use them to explain investments in 
Nigeria.  Bokpin and Onumah (2009) also use them to analyze investments of manufacturing 
firms in several emerging markets. Here we should mention that the opportunities-investment 
variable that we use is the one proposed by Bøhren, Cooper and Priestley (2007) (the capital-
to-output ratio). We use it because it includes the same information as the Tobin’s marginal q 
variable, the traditional measure of investment opportunities, without including market 
values. 
 
3.3 Modeling specification and econometric techniques 
We use a log-linear functional form specification to describe the relationships among 
corporate governance, market competition and investment decisions. Such specification 
                                                
4
 When firm-level data are available Garcia-Alba (1990) defines the DI as: 
∑
=






=
n
k s
ks
s
HHI
m
DI
1
2
2
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explicitly assumes a Cobb-Douglas function. Such function allows marginal investment of 
each independent variable to depend of the amount of the independent available. 
Econometrically, the log-linear specification allows the regression coefficients to measure the 
elasticity of investment with respect to each independent variable (determinant). Moreover, 
the log transformation reduces the possibility of heteroscedasticity problems.  
 
The assessment approach uses two sets of regressions for comparison purposes. The first set 
includes estimations that use the HHI as measure of market concentration. The second one 
uses estimations with the DI. We use two sets because both measures can be substitutes and 
linearly related.  Each set also includes the two complementary measures of agency costs for 
consistency and completeness. Each set is integrated by four regressions that focus on a 
specific type of firm (micro, small, medium and large). Thus the model specification is: 
ijijijijijijijij SCFIOAUOEMCI εααααααα +++++++= lnlnlnlnlnlnln 7654310            (5) 
 
where Iij is the log of investment; MCij is the log of the market concentration measure; OEij is 
the log of the operating-expenses ratio; AUij is the log of the asset utilization ratio; IOij is the 
log of investment opportunities; CFij is the log of the cash-flow variable; Sij is the log of the 
size of the firm; and  ijε  is the random error term. 
 
We use the Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) technique to develop the regression analysis. 
Statistically the OLS technique provides us the best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) under 
certain assumptions. Such assumptions include: 1) Linearity of the parameters; 2) Normality 
of errors, ijε ~ ( )2,0N σ ; 3) Homoscedasticity, 2ij][VAR σ=ε ;  4) No specification bias in the 
model; and 5) No perfect multicollinearity. Here we support the adequacy of the OLS 
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assumptions and the robustness of our results with several complementary statistical tests. 
Such tests include the Jarque-Bera, the Breuch-Pagan and the Ramseys´ RESET ones.  
 
4. Empirical assessment  
We begin by exploring the correlations between the independent variables. Concretely, we 
use pairwise correlation analysis to assess the degree of collinearity between the operating-
expenses and asset-utilization ratios. We also estimate the correlations between the ownership 
and management indexes. We summarize the statistical results in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Correlations among the independent variables 
 
Firm Size/ 
Correlations 
Agency 
cost 
variables 
Market 
concentration 
indexes 
HHI and 
asset 
utilization 
ratios 
HHI and 
operating 
expenses 
ratios 
DI and 
asset 
utilization 
ratios 
DI and  
operating 
expenses 
ratios 
Micro 0.0474 
(0.526) 
0.7696*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0052 
(0.9447) 
0.1691** 
(0.0229) 
-0.0358 
(0.6320) 
0.0259* 
(0.089) 
Small 0.0858 
(0.2509) 
0.3697*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0270 
(0.7182) 
0.1411* 
(0.0582) 
0.2648*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0647* 
(0.0868) 
Medium  -0.0842 
(0.2651) 
0.2664*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0563 
(0.4569) 
0.1455* 
(0.0534) 
0.1533** 
(0.0416) 
0.0917** 
(0.0248) 
Large  -0.0881 
(0.2503) 
0.2598*** 
(0.0006) 
0.0616 
(0.4225) 
0.0127* 
(0.0685) 
0.1167* 
(0.074) 
0.0497* 
(0.0517) 
The estimations use pairwise correlations. The agency cost variables include the asset-utilization and 
operating-expenses ratios. The concentration indexes include the HHI and the DI.  Significance levels are given 
in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.     
 
Table 3 confirms the necessity to use two regression sets to develop the econometric analysis. 
The results show that the measures of agency costs are complementary and that the ones of 
market concentration are substitutes. The non significant correlations between the agency 
cost proxies shows that they are statistically independent and that they can be included in 
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single regressions. However, this is not the case for the concentration measures.  The finding 
of multicollinearity justifies the necessity to use independent regression sets for the HHI and 
DI variables. Furthermore the results show significant correlations between the operating-
expenses ratio and the concentration measures. This finding suggests the existence of an 
inverse relationship between market competition and agency costs.   
 
Tables (4) and (5) show the main estimation outcomes for the two sets of regressions defined 
by model (1). Concretely, Table (4) reports the outcomes for the regressions that use the HHI 
market concentration variable as determinant of investment decisions. Table (5) reports the 
outcomes for the regressions that use the DI concentration variable. Furthermore, both tables 
also report some statistical estimators to assess the adequacy of the regressions ant to support 
the econometric analysis. These estimators are the Jarque-Bera and Breusch-Pagan ones to 
assess, respectively, the normality and homocedasticity of residuals.  
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Table 4.  Market concentration measures, agency cost proxies and investment decisions 
in Mexican manufacturing firms 
(OLS regressions that include the Herfindal-Hirshmann Index) 
 
Firm size Micro Small  Medium Large    
Regression indicators 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 0.02 
(0.12) 
0.37 
(1.03) 
-0.29* 
(-1.68) 
-0.14 
(-0.67) 
Operating-expenses ratio 0.48** 
(2.44) 
0.61** 
(2.48) 
0.99** 
(2.53) 
0.83** 
(2.45) 
Asset-utilization ratio 0.01 
(1.17) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.24) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
Cash flow 0.19* 
(1.76) 
0.06 
(0.62) 
0.33*** 
(3.90) 
0.18*** 
(3.04) 
Size  0.82*** 
(6.76) 
1.01*** 
(9.27) 
0.63*** 
(5.55) 
0.77*** 
(11.73) 
Investment opportunities  0.28** 
(2.10) 
0.49*** 
(2.67) 
-0.11 
(-0.45) 
0.66*** 
(3.18) 
Constant -8.41*** 
(-8.15) 
-9.39*** 
(-4.40) 
-5.43*** 
(3.54) 
-5.07*** 
(-3.93) 
Observations 181 181 177 172 
F 126.52*** 115.56*** 43.15*** 107.43*** 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2  0.81 0.80 0.60 0.80 
Jarque-Bera 2.02 1.14 4.84 4.72 
Prob > χ2 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.11 
Breusch-Pagan 6.16 5.50 4.70 1.01 
Prob > χ2 0.13 0.19 0.23 0.31 
The dependent variable is investment. The t-statistics are given in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate 
significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
  
Table 4 reports the outcomes for the first set of regressions.  In all the regressions, the 
coefficients associated to the operating-expense ratio are positive and mostly significant. 
Furthermore, the HHI coefficient is negative for medium and large firms. Indeed, for medium 
firms the coefficient is also significant. In most cases the coefficients associated to all the 
control variables are positive and significant. Thus the results support the claim that the 
increases in the separation of ownership and control or in the degree of market competition 
may encourage investment decisions. 
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Statistically, the goodness-of-fit estimators and complementary tests support the 
robustness of our results. In all cases, the R
2
 estimators are relatively high and the joint 
significance tests suggest that the all the explanatory variables are necessary. Furthermore, 
the Jarque-Bera tests do not reject the null hypothesis of normality and the Breusch-Pagan 
tests do not reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. Thus the regression models seem 
to explain the relationships among corporate governance, market competition and investment 
decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms. 
 
Table 5 reports the outcomes for the second set of regressions.  Like in the previous 
table, all the regressions, the coefficients associated to the operating-expense ratio are 
positive and mostly significant. Interestingly, the DI concentration coefficient is negative and 
significant for medium and large firms. Indeed the t-estimators of the DI variables are more 
significant than the HHI ones. Thus, from a statistical point of view, the evidence suggests 
that the DI variable may be a better determinant than the HHI one. Apparently, differences in 
firms´ size matter. These results confirm and complement the ones regarding the effects of 
corporate governance and market competition on investment.  
 
The estimation of the goodness-of-fit estimators and complementary tests also confirm our 
previous findings. Again, the R
2
 estimators are relatively high and the joint significance tests 
suggest that the all the explanatory variables are necessary. Furthermore, the Jarque-Bera 
tests confirm normality and the Breusch-Pagan tests accept that residuals are homoscedastic. 
The results again show that the coefficients associated to the control variables are positive 
and significant in most of the cases. Moreover, they confirm that the asset-utilization ratio is 
not a significant determinant of investment decisions. 
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Table 5.  Market concentration measures, agency cost proxies and investment decisions 
in Mexican manufacturing firms 
(OLS regressions that include the Dominance Index) 
 
Firm size Micro Small  Medium Large    
Regression indicators 
Dominance Index (DI) 0.12 
(1.13) 
0.32 
(1.17) 
-0.66*** 
(-2.98) 
-0.75** 
(-2.59) 
Operating expenses ratio 0.49** 
(2.52) 
0.58** 
(2.35) 
1.03*** 
(2.69) 
0.80*** 
(2.42) 
Asset utilization ratio 0.01 
(1.22) 
0.00 
(0.35) 
-0.00 
(-0.34) 
-0.00 
(-0.27) 
Cash flow 0.20* 
(1.82) 
0.05 
(0.50) 
0.35*** 
(4.14) 
0.20*** 
(3.32) 
Size  0.82*** 
(6.81) 
1.00*** 
(9.22) 
0.63*** 
(5.69) 
0.75*** 
(11.53) 
Investment opportunities  0.28** 
(2.16) 
0.49*** 
2.66 
-0.06 
(-0.25) 
0.73*** 
(3.56) 
Constant -8.21*** 
(-7.94) 
-9.94*** 
(-5.94) 
-6.51*** 
(-4.19) 
-6.44*** 
(-4.94) 
Observations 181 181 177 172 
F 127.66*** 115.81*** 45.65*** 112.51*** 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R2  0.81 0.80 0.62 0.80 
Jarque-Bera 1.97 1.26 4.41 4.86 
Prob > χ2 0.18 0.21 0.12 0.10 
Breusch-Pagan 6.35 5.21 9.60 0.27 
Prob > χ2 0.17 0.22 0.10 0.60 
The dependent variable is investment. The t-statistics are given in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate 
significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
One of the main assumptions of the classical linear regression model is that the model is 
correctly specified. Here we assess this assumption for both regression sets with Ramsey´s 
RESET tests. Such tests are used to detect omitted variable-bias and/or incorrect functional 
forms. Here we use two variations of such test. The first one, the traditional RESET test, uses 
powers of the estimated independent variable as regressors. The second one uses powers of 
the RHS variables. The null hypothesis in both versions of the test is that the model is 
adequately specified (see Table 6). 
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The Ramsey´s RESET tests show that the regressions used to assess the determinants of 
investment in the medium and large firms do not have specification errors. However such 
finding does not hold for the micro and small firms.  Such errors may occur due to the 
omission of non-measurable variables that may not be correlated with the corporate 
governance and market competition ones. We believe that the intuition, the social networks 
and the experience of the entrepreneurs may be some of these determinants.  Thus our 
findings may be used to justify the necessity to develop qualitative studies to understand 
corporate decisions in micro and small firms. 
Table 6. Specification tests for the regression models 
Firm size Micro Small  Medium Large    
 
Models with Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
RESET test 
(H0: model has no omitted variables 
11.81*** 8.22*** 0.63 1.00 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.5974 0.3939 
RHS-Ramsey test 
(H0: model has no omitted variables) 
2.81*** 2.03** 1.44 1.21 
Prob > F 0.0003 0.0109 0.1227 0.2604 
 
Models with Dominance Index (DI) 
RESET test 
(H0: model has no omitted variables 
11.61*** 8.21*** 1.35 1.71 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.2614 0.1666 
RHS-Ramsey test 
(H0: model has no omitted variables) 
3.51*** 2.04*** 0.89 1.15 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0107 0.5909 0.3128 
The table shows the results of the Ramseys´ tests for the two sets of investment-determinant regressions. We show shows two 
versions of such test. The first one, the traditional RESET test, uses powers of the estimated independent variable as 
regressors. The second one uses powers of the RHS variables. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 
5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
We summarize our findings by indicating that the evidence suggests that the separation of 
ownership and control and market competition may encourage investment decisions. Our 
findings show that increases in agency costs or decreases in market concentration may 
increase investment in the manufacturing sector. Indeed the evidence suggests that the DI 
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variable may be a better determinant than the HHI one. Furthermore, the estimations support 
the necessity to include firm´ size, investment opportunities and cash flow as explanatory 
variables. The effects of the control variables on investment are mostly significant and 
positive. 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion  
We have studied how corporate governance and market competition determinants may 
explain investment decisions of Mexican manufacturing firms. We have studied them with 
census data of the 182 manufacturing industries, OLS regressions and statistical tests. The 
empirical study has relied on the estimation of two sets of regressions that include agency 
cost proxies and market concentration determinants. The agency cost proxies, the operating-
expenses and asset-utilization ratios, are measures of the degree of separation between 
ownership and control. The market concentration measures include the HHI and DI indexes.   
 
The evidence suggests that the separation of ownership and control and market competition 
may encourage investment decisions among the manufacturing firms. Increases in agency 
costs or decreases in market concentration may increase investment. Moreover the evidence 
suggests that the DI may be a better determinant than the HHI one. The estimations also show 
that the effects of firms´ size, cash flow and investment opportunities are mostly significant 
and positive. Furthermore, the statistical tests suggest that the regression models explain 
adequately investment decisions mainly for medium and large firms.  
 
However, we should point out that our findings do no limit themselves to the determination 
of the significant determinants of capital formation. Statistically, the evidence suggests that 
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the DI is a better investment-determinant than the HHI. This finding implies that the degree 
of competition can affected by differences in the size of the firms in the market.  The 
evidence also suggests that the asset-utilization ratio is not a determinant of investment 
decisions. Furthermore, it suggests that the modeling structure proposed is useful mainly for 
medium and large firms. 
 
We believe that our findings support some hypotheses regarding corporate governance and 
market competition. Concretely they support that one that states that the degree of the 
separation between ownership and control explains investment decisions [Grabowski and 
Mueller (1972)]. Indeed, the evidence confirms the existence of a positive relationship 
between cash flows and investment for firms that experience agency problems. Furthermore 
our findings support the hypothesis that market competition may be an alternative mechanism 
to encourage corporate practices in emerging economies [Allen (2005)].  We should recall 
that our findings suggest an inverse relationship between competition and agency costs.   
 
We also believe that our study supports the belief that corporate governance and market 
competition may encourage economic growth in emerging economies. However, we must 
recognize that further research on the relationships between corporate finance, industrial 
organization and economic development is necessary to prove such hypothesis. Mayer 
(2001), Estrin (2002) and Allen (2005) provide several ideas to study such relationships from 
different perspectives. Particularly, our findings suggest that further studies on the 
determinants of investment and corporate decisions may be necessary in the context of micro 
and small firms. Thus the analysis of these relationships seems a fruitful venue for future 
research. 
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